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ABSTRACT
In an investigation of some possible limitations of 
Equity Theory, subjects were hired for half an hour's work 
for either high or low pay compared to Other. In each pay 
condition, half the subjects had an Other who existed only 
in E's instructions; the remaining half worked in the pres­
ence of Other. Subjects reduced inequity by cognitively 
distorting their own and Other's inputs, but not by adjust­
ing work quantity or quality or cognitively distorting 
outcomes. Contrary to Equity Theory predictions, overpaid 
subjects were more favorable toward E and toward the task 
than underpaid subjects. Presence vs. absence of Other had 
almost no effect. Extensions of the theory, dealing with 
subjects' choices of strategies, relationships with Other, 
and attitudes toward the employer, were suggested.
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INTRODUCTION
A number of widely divergent efforts have been made 
to account for the role of monetary reward in the perform­
ance and job satisfaction of the worker in business and 
industry. Classical management theory views money as 
sufficient in itself as an incentive to work, while human 
relations theorists stress the importance of higher-order 
needs for which money may provide at best a symbolic 
fulfillment. A current approach to the problem is that of 
the social comparison theorists, who focus on pay as a basis 
for the worker's comparison of himself to others in his 
environment engaged in similar work, with satisfaction a 
function of the outcome of the comparison.
This consideration of the worker's awareness of his 
social context is a relevant onej in the world outside the 
laboratory, there are many situations where individuals are 
engaged in similar work for different amounts of pay (e.g., 
in certain areas of management) or where they bring widely 
differing levels of qualification into similar jobs and 
receive the same pay (most notably in the military) . The 
present paper addresses itself to the question of the role 
of the comparison person in determining worker productivity 
and morale under inequitable pay circumstances.
The major theoretical framework within which this 
problem is currently considered is that of Equity Theory. 
Although several authors have proposed very similar equity 
theories (Zaleznik, Christensen, & Roethlisberger, 1958; 
Patchen, 1961; Homans, 1961; Jacques, 1961; Adams, 1963a), 
the recent statement by Adams (1965) seems to be the most 
thorough and heuristic. This statement emphasizes the 
relationship between a worker's job outcome-input ratio and 
that of a comparison "Other," presumably another worker in 
a comparable job. As long as the ratios are equal, equity 
exists for "Person," as Adams (1965) calls him, and Person 
experiences satisfaction. The equitable state is symbolized 
thus:
where 0 and JE are outcomes and inputs respectively, jd is 
Person, and a is Other.
If, however, any type of inequality exists between 
the ratios, there is a state of inequity, and a dissatisfied 
Person is motivated to resolve this inequity. He may do so 
by materially changing his own inputs or outcomes, by cog­
nitively distorting one or the other of them, by materially 
or cognitively altering the value of Other's inputs or out­
comes, or by adopting a new Other. Adams (1965) provides 
rough guidelines for predicting which of these courses Person
will follow in restoring equity; the most significant is 
that he will always seek to maximize his outcomes and mini­
mize his inputs to the fullest extent without creating some 
new form of inequity.
The theory makes several basic predictions, and 
thes.e have found considerable empirical support. First, it 
is predicted and has been shown that inequitably overpaid 
Ss receiving a piecework rate will improve the quality of 
their work while decreasing its quantity, thus lowering their 
outcomes while maintaining a balance of inputs (Adams & 
Rosenbaum, 1962; Adams, 1963b; Adams & Jacobsen, 1964; 
Andrews, 1967). Likewise, overpaid Ss receiving an hourly 
rate will generally increase quantity and decrease the 
quality of their work, thereby raising their inputs to match 
outcomes in a way that is not much more demanding on them­
selves (Adams & Rosenbaum, 1962; Adams, 1963b). The effects 
of inequitably low pay on performance have been investigated 
only in the piecework rate condition; support has been found 
for the prediction that Ss in this situation tend to increase 
quantity, thereby increasing total pay, with a concurrent 
decrease in quality (Lawler & O'Gara, 1967; Andrews, 1967).
Regarding Person's attempts to deal with inequity at 
the cognitive level, Weick and Prestholdt (1968) have demon­
strated cognitive distortion by S_s of the importance of 
monetary reward in an underpaying condition. Weick (1964) 
and Lawler and O'Gara (1967) found cognitive enhancement of
the task itself by underpaid Ss trying to justify their 
participation.
A major shortcoming of the research supporting 
Equity Theory is that., with few exceptions, most of the ex­
perimentation done thus far has used Ss working under 
isolated conditions, with Other existing only in E's instruc­
tions. Pritchard (1969) suggests— logically, but without 
benefit of empirical data— that the impact of Other's O-I 
ratio on Person's performance may be seen in some situations 
only when Person and Other are in a direct, face-to-face 
relationship. Specifically, Pritchard speculates, contrary 
to some of the data cited above, that overpayment does not 
necessarily lead to dissatisfaction and that Person will 
always try to maximize his own gains unless he is in the 
actual presence of an Other whose ratio is lower than his 
own. Such a question about the necessity of Other's pres­
ence would appear to be a critical one for Equity Theory and 
yet one which cannot be answered from existing data.
In the present investigation, Ss were engaged to 
work for either low or high pay by comparison to Other. In 
each of these pay conditions, half the Ss had an Other who 
existed only in E's instructions, as has been the case in 
Equity Theory research heretofore. The other half actually 
worked in the presence of Other, a situation more representa­
tive of the typical job setting in business and industry.
Such an approach allowed an evaluation of the effects of the
physical presence of Other in overpay and underpay situa­
tions, involving in the former case a direct test of 
Pritchard's (1969) hypothesis. Measures were taken of work 
quantity and quality, as well as of the Ss1 evaluations of 
13 (their employer), Other, the task itself, and the adequacy 
and importance of the monetary payment. Specific predic­
tions were as follows:
1. Regarding work quantity, Adams (1965) predicts 
greater output by the hourly overpaid Ss than by underpaid 
Ss, regardless of the presence or absence of Other. In the 
light of supporting data, we expected to find a statisti­
cally significant main effect of pay on work quantity in 
the predicted direction under both Other Present and Other 
Absent conditions. Pritchard (1969), on the other hand, 
predicts this effect only when Other is present; support for 
his position would have taken the form of a significant 
interaction effect.
2. As for work quality, the Equity Theory predic­
tion is based on a demonstrated inverse relationship between 
this variable and quantity, again regardless of Other's 
presence or absence. If the theory were supported, we would 
have expected a main effect of pay only, with work quality 
being higher (i.e., errors less) on the part of the underpaid 
Ss. According to Pritchard (1969), however, work quality 
should have shown a significant, effect of the interaction 
between Other's presence and pay level, with the highest work
6quality in the Underpay-Other Absent condition.
3. Drawing from the propositions of Equity Theory, 
it was predicted that the evaluation of the confederate in 
the Other Present conditions would show a main effect of 
pay level, with his being viewed less favorably when paid 
less than £3. Pritchard (1969), though, predicts no dis­
satisfaction with Other in the face-to-face situations, since 
the inequity would be attributed by Person to the employer
in control of the circumstances. In either case, ratings 
of the confederate in the Other Absent conditions provided 
bases for comparison.
4. Ss' ratings of the task were also expected to 
show statistically significant main effects of pay level, 
being more favorable for the underpaid Ss due to the task 
enhancement predicted by Equity Theory. If Pritchard's 
(1969) statement applied to cognitive as well as performance 
aspects of Ss' response to inequity— and he does not make 
himself clear on this point— we would also have expected to 
find greater cognitive distortion with Other p'resent than 
with Other absent.
5. Similarly, Equity Theory predicts that monetary 
reward is less important to underpaid than to overpaid Ss, 
regardless of Other's presence or absence. Pritchard (1969) 
might be interpreted to predict the existence of this effect 
to a greater extent in the Other Present conditions.
76. Adams (1965) and Equity Theory make no statement 
about Person's reaction to the third party— the employer in 
the work situation and E in the present experiment.
Pritchard (1969) suggests that Person would appropriately 
attribute inequity to an employer who causes it, and that 
underpaid Ss would view such an employer negatively. Pre­
sumably, then, Ss would also look favorably on an employer 
who overpaid them, particularly in the conditions where 
Other is absent and inequity less. An alternate possibility 
more in line with Equity Theory is that underpaid Ss might 
enhance E in the same way they have been found to cognitively 
enhance the task.
METHOD
Subjects
Participants in the study were 80 volunteer male 
students from introductory marketing and economics courses 
at the Baton Rouge campus of Louisiana State University.
They were divided randomly into four groups of 20 each.
Materials
No special equipment was required other than several 
decks of 300 punched IBM cards each. The experiment was 
conducted in a quiet, well-lighted room containing three 
tables and two chairs. Prior to each trial, a thoroughly 
shuffled deck of IBM cards was placed on the table at which 
S_ was to work. On the confederate's table was placed either 
a page of arithmetic problems or a deck of IBM cards, de­
pending on the nature of the trial to follow. The third 
table contained a sign stating, "GRADUATE STUDENTS: MAKE
SURE EACH RESEARCH PARTICIPANT FILLS OUT ONE OF THESE, " and 
a box of "Assessment of Psychological Research" question­
naires. The questionnaire, as shown in Appendix A, purported 
to be a departmental inquiry into participants' reactions to 
graduate research. In it, Ss were asked to rate 13 along 
several descriptive dimensions and then to rate " . . .  an­
other person in the experimental situation . . ." to provide 
a baseline. The questionnaire also asked Ss to evaluate the
task they participated in as to how interesting it was and 
its contribution to science as well as the fairness and 
importance of the pay and how well they felt they and other 
participants might have done. E also had available a supply 
of "Research Agreement" forms as shown in Appendix B.
Procedure
All Ss were scheduled individually; a male confed­
erate, posing as a student £5, was present during each 
experimental session. The use of male Ss only and a male 
confederate was intended to eliminate the possible confound­
ing effects of the sex variable; the same confederate was 
paired with every S.. For half the Sjs, pay was arbitrarily 
higher than that for Other; for the other half, lower. In 
half of each of these situations, the confederate was Other, 
performing the same task as Sj in the other half, Other 
existed only in the instructions and the confederate, present 
as a control against social facilitation effects in the Other 
Present conditions, worked the page of arithmetic problems.
Initially, Ss were recruited in their classes by 
being asked to participate in the development of a test to 
be used in selecting computer personnel and being told that 
each would receive one dollar for 30 minutes of participa­
tion. As each £ reported to E, he was taken into the 
experimental room and seated; the confederate arrived im­
mediately thereafter, identified himself as a participant,
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and was also seated. Half the time, the table at which the 
confederate was seated held a deck of IBM cards similar to 
that of J3, as though in readiness for a similar task. In 
the Overpay-Other Present condition, received these in­
structions :
EXPERIMENTER: "I'm going to put the two of you in
the same room since you're both working on the same 
task. (E hands the confederate his Research Agreement 
form, then begins to fill out a form for S..) Let's 
see, (S) , I recruited you from the Marketing/Economics 
class, and I told you you'd get a dollar for your par­
ticipation. Will you both sign these so I can account 
for the money I pay out?"
CONFEDERATE: (Holding up his copy of the Research
Agreement) "I thought you told us we'd be paid $.50 
for this half hour."
EXPERIMENTER: "Well, you are. Actually, I recruited
different classes at different times for different 
amounts. People from your class are getting $.50, while 
those from his are getting a dollar. Now, I'd like you 
both to listen while I tell you what to do."
In the Underpay-Other Present condition, the amount "$2.00" 
was substituted for the "$.50" pay for Other, with no fur­
ther changes in the instructions.
For the other half of the Ss, the confederate was 
seated at a table with a pencil and the page of problems.
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Instructions were as follows for the Overpay-Other Absent 
condition:
EXPERIMENTER: "I'm going to put the two of you in
the same room even though you're working on different 
things. (E begins to fill out a Research Agreement 
form for S.) Let's see, (S) , I recruited you from the 
Marketing/Economic class, and I told you you'd get a 
dollar for your participation. Will you sign this so I 
can account for the money I pay out?"
CONFEDERATE: "I heard you were paying them $.50
for the half hour."
EXPERIMENTER: "Well, I am in some cases. Actually,
I recruited different classes at different times for 
different amounts. Some people are getting $.50, while 
those from his class are getting a dollar. Now, read 
the directions at the top of this page while I give him 
the instructions for his task."
In the Underpay-Other Absent condition, the amount "$2.00" 
was substituted for "$.50"; no other changes were made in 
the instructions.
Following the condition-specific directions, all Ss 
received these instructions from E. about the task:
"As I've told you, we're trying to develop a bat­
tery of tests for predicting the job success of people 
working with computers— programmers, keypunch operators, 
people like that. Right now, we want to see how well
people perform on several tasks we're considering; we 
want to get norms for those tasks. Your particular 
task involves the deck of IBM cards that you (both) 
have in front of you. You can see that each card has 
80 columns of numbers on it. Each column goes from "0" 
at the top to "9” at the bottom; generally speaking, 
there is a number punched out in each column. I'm going 
to give you exactly 30 minutes, and your job in that 
time will be to put as many of the cards as you can in 
numerical order, as accurately as possible, according 
to the numbers that are punched out. For example, this 
card with the "0" punched in the first column, here, 
would go before this card with the "4" in the first 
column. For another example, both these cards have a 
"4" in the first column, so this one with the "5" in 
the second column would go before this other one with 
the "8” there. You are not necessarily expected to put 
the entire deck in order in the time allowed; I want 
you just to do as many as you can as accurately as pos­
sible.”
Ss were then timed for 30 minutes. The seating 
arrangement was such that no £5 could ever see exactly how 
much work the confederate did, as Goodman and Friedman 
(1968) have shown that providing quantitative standards of 
performance in such a situation results in a significant 
decrease in production variance. At the conclusion of the
timed period, each J3 received a dollar; the confederate was 
also paid at that time in the appropriate conditions.
Finally, in each case, 13 handed copies of the "Assess­
ment of Psychological Research" questionnaire to _S and the 
confederate with these instructions:
EXPERIMENTER: "I've finished with what I want you
to do, but before you go the Psychology Department wants 
me to ask each of you to fill out one of these. They're 
evaluating this research, and they're interested in your 
reaction to the activities you've been involved in here. 
Don't talk to each other about these, and don't put your 
names on them. When you finish, take them down the hall 
to Room 230— the Psychology Department office— and put 
them in the box marked 'Research Evaluation Question­
naires .' Look over these and make sure you understand 
them before you fill them out."
CONFEDERATE: (After looking over his questionnaire)
"In Part II, here, does this mean that I rate him and he 
rates me for the baseline evaluation?"
EXPERIMENTER: "That's right."
The confederate in each instance finished his ques­
tionnaire and delivered it to the office just before S_. The 
confederate's distinctive marking of his own questionnaire 
allowed E later to identify the condition of the J3 whose 
questionnaire was immediately on top of it.
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Due to the fact that Ss participated one at a time, 
thus necessarily extending the experiment over a period of 
several weeks, there was no debriefing of individual Ss, to 
minimize chances for communication with their classmates on 
the nature of the study. The confederate periodically en­
gaged random departing Ss in conversation to determine if 
they had heard anything about the experiment from earlier 
participants. In no instance was this found to be the case.
For each £3, a count was made of total cards ordered 
and of errors in card order; these data were recorded to­
gether with his questionnaire responses. Total cards (work 
quantity), total correct cards and proportion of errors 
(both work quality), and the responses were analyzed using 
a 2 x 2 Fixed Effects Model analysis of variance.
RESULTS
Tables showing cell means and standard deviations 
and ANOVA summaries for dependent variables yielding non­
significant results are compiled in Appendix C, Tables 14 
through 30. Similar material for those variables yielding 
significant results is integrated into the body of this 
report.
With regard to the performance variables, none 
showed significant effects of either pay level or presence 
vs. absence of Other. Summaries of analyses of variance 
are shown in Table 16 for total cards ordered, Table 17 for 
percent of cards ordered incorrectly, and Table 18 for num­
ber of cards sorted correctly; cell means for these treat­
ments are given in Table 14 and standard deviations in Table 
15. The number of cards sorted ranged from 22 to 300 for 
the whole sample; the sample mean was 85.887. Percent errors 
ranged from 2% to 55% with a mean of approximately 23%. Num­
ber of cards sorted correctly showed a range from 15 to 216, 
with a mean of 58.788. The task, then, appears to have been 
one which permitted a great deal of variability in individ­
ual performance, while absolute differences between treatment 
cells were quite small.
The remaining dependent variables consist of subjects' 
responses to the Assessment of Psychological Research
15
questionnaire; the first group of these pertain to ratings 
of the "researcher." As can be seen from Tables 19., 20, 21, 
and 22, no significant differences were obtained from the 
ratings on the adjectives "Pleasant," "Careful," and "Con­
siderate" or on the general favorability scale. Cell means 
for these variables are shown in Table 14 and standard 
deviations in Table 15. Cell means for the remaining three 
adjectival ratings of E appear in Table 1, with standard 
deviations in Table 2.
The ANOVA summary in Table 3 shows a significant 
main effect of the manipulation of pay on the subjects' 
ratings of the experimenter as "Businesslike." Means were 
1.550 for the overpaid Ss and 2.100 for the underpaid Ss.
The higher the numerical rating, the less favorable it is 
to the ratee. There were no significant effects of pres­
ence vs. absence of Other or of the two-factor interaction.
Ratings of the experimenter on the adjective "Effi­
cient" also yielded a significant main effect of the overpay 
underpay variable, while the effects of Other's presence and 
of the interaction were non-significant (see Table 4). Over 
paid Ss assigned a mean rating of 1.350 to the experimenter 
on this variable, while Ss in the underpay conditions 
assigned him a mean rating of 1.925.
As Table 5 indicates, ratings of the experimenter 
as "Capable" showed an effect of pay level similar to that 
on the two adjectives discussed above. Those who were
17
TABLE 1
Cell Means for Those Dependent Variables Yielding 
Statistically Significant Differences
Underpay Overpay
Variables 0 Absent 0 Present 0 Absent 0 Present
Questionnaire - 
Part I (Experimen­
ter)
"Bus ine s s1ike" 1.950 2.250 1.550 1.550
"Efficient" 1.900 1.950 1.400 1.300
"Capable" 1.850 2.050 1.350 1.500
Total Evaluation 13.250 13.950 10.300 11.000
Questionnaire - 
Part II (Confederate)
"Careful" 2.250 2.150 2.800 2.600
"Businesslike" 1.950 2.550 3.100 3.250
"Capable" 1.900 2.250 2.600 2.800
Total Evaluation 15.100 16.900 19.950 19.900
Questionnaire - 
Part III (Research)
(a) Interesting 
task? 3.700 4.250 2.550 3.250
(b) Evaluation of 
own performance 2.950 3.800 3.150 3 .600
(d) Importance of 
doing best 2.250 2.100 1.450 1.850
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TABLE 2
Cell Standard Deviations for Those Dependent 
Variables Yielding Statistically 
Significant Differences
Underpay Overpay
Variables O Absent 0 Present 0 Absent O Present
Questionnaire - 
Part I (Experimenter)
"Businesslike" 1.316 1.332 0.758 0 . 758
"Efficient" 1.252 1.637 0.680 0 . 470
"Capable" 1.225 1.571 0.933 0 . 606
Total Evaluation 6.248 7.037 3.881 3..684
Questionnaire - 
Part II
"Careful” 0.637 1.308 1.151 0.820
"Businesslike" 1.145 1.700 1.518 1.618
"Capable" 0.788 1.208 1.313 0.833
Total Evaluation 4.178 6.904 7.796 6.479
lestionnaire - 
irt III
(a) Interesting 
task? 1.688 1.409 1.467 1.681
(b) Evaluation of 
own performance 1.049 1.472 1.348 1.500
(d) Importance of 
doing best 1.585 1.118 0.944 0.933
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TABLE 3
Analysis of Variance: Ratings of E on the 
Adjective "Businesslike"
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 0.450 1 0.450 0.386
B (Pay Level) 6.050 1 6.050 5.190*
A x B 0.450 1 0.450 0.386
Error 88.600 76 1.166
Totals 95.550 79
*p <  .05.
TABLE 4
Analysis of Variance: Ratings 
Adjective "Efficient
of E
. I
on the
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 0.012 1 0.012 0.010
B (Pay Level) 6.612 1 6.612 5.361*
A x B 0.112 1 0.112 0.091
Error 93.750 76 1.234
Totals 100.487 79
*p <( .05.
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overpaid produced a mean rating of 1.425; underpaid subjects, 
a mean rating of 1.950. The main effect of Other's presence 
or absence and the effect of interaction were not statisti­
cally significant.
TABLE 5
Analysis of Variance: Ratings of E on the 
Adjective "Capable"
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 0.612 1 0.612 0.470
B (Pay Level) 5.512 1 5.512 4.230*
A x B 0.012 1 0.012 0.009
Error 99.050 76. 1.303
Totals 105.187 79
*P ^ .05.
To obtain an overall picture of the Ss’ reactions to 
E, the individual six-point scale ratings were summed, pro­
ducing a "Total Evaluation" variable with a possible range 
from 7 (highly favorable) to 42 (highly unfavorable). Table 
6 shows that pay level, but not presence of Other or inter­
action, had a significant effect on the Total Evaluation.
The average total rating of E by the underpaid Ss was 
13.600, while the average for the overpaid Ss was 10.650; 
cell means are shown in Table 1 and standard deviations in 
Table 2.
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TABLE 6
Analysis of Variance: Total Evaluation of E
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 9.800 1 9.800 0.334
B (Pay Level) 174.050 1 174.050 5.940*
A x B 0.000 1 0.000 0.000
Error 2226.900 76 29.301
Totals 2410.750 79
*p ^  .05.
Pour of the subjects' ratings of the confederate 
showed no significant results; cell means and standard devia­
tions for these four variables are given in Tables 14 and 15 
respectively. Summary tables for each analysis— "Pleasant," 
"Efficient," "Considerate, ” and the general rating— are in 
Tables 23, 24, 25, and 26 respectively. Means and standard 
deviations for subjects’ ratings of the confederate as 
"Careful," "Businesslike," and "Capable" are shown for each 
cell in Tables 1 and 2.
Perception of the confederate as "Careful" reflected 
a significant main effect of pay level, as shown in Table 7. 
Overpaid subjects viewed the confederate as less careful, 
with a mean rating of 2.700; underpaid subjects assigned to 
the confederate a mean rating of 2.200 on this dimension. 
Ratings were not affected by whether or not the confederate
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was Other, as the main effect of this latter variable was 
not significant. The interaction effect was also non­
significant.
TABLE 7
Analysis of Variance: Ratings of the Confederate 
on the Adjective "Careful"
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 0.450 1 0.450 0.437
B (Pay Level) 5.000 1 5.000 4.853*
A x B 0.050 1 0.050 0.049
Error 78.300 76
Totals 83.800 79
*p <  .05.
Subjects' ratings of the confederate on the "Busi­
nesslike" scale demonstrated the significant effect of pay 
level only. Underpaid subjects rated the confederate more 
favorably on this attribute than did overpaid subjects; mean 
ratings for these two groups were 2.250 and 3.175 respec^ 
tively. Table 8 presents the ANOVA summary for this varia­
ble .
The third confederate rating showing a significant 
effect was that on the adjective "Capable" (see Table 9). 
Overpaid subjects assigned the higher (less favorable) mean 
rating of 2.700; underpaid subjects assigned the mean rating
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of 2.075. The difference in ratings due to pay level was 
statistically significant; effects of Other's presence and 
of the interaction were not.
TABLE 8
Analysis of Variance: Ratings of the Confederate 
on the Adjective "Businesslike"
Source SS df MS P
A (Presence of Other) 2.812 1 2.812 1.232
B (Pay Level) 17.112 1 17.112 7.498*
A x B 1.012 1 1.012 0.444
Error 173.450 76 2.282
Totals 194.387 79
*p <  .'05.
TABLE 9
Analysis of Variance: Ratings 
on the Adjective "
of the 
Capable
Confederate
II
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 1.512 1 1.512 1.344
B (Pay Level) 7.812 1 7.812 6.941*
A x B 0.112 1 0.112 0.100
Error 85.550 76 1.126
Totals 94.987 79
*p <.05.
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A Total Evaluation score was computed for the con­
federate similar to that obtained for E. As with the 
individual adjective ratings, the only significant differ­
ence found here was due to the main effect of pay level. 
Overpaid Ss were less favorable to the Confederate, with a 
mean total rating of 19.925, than were underpaid Ss, with 
a mean rating of 16.000. The analysis is summarized in 
Table 10.
TABLE 10
Analysis of Variance: Total Evaluation of 
the Confederate
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 15.312 1 15.312 0.365
B (Pay Level) 308.112 1 308.112 7.340*
A x B 17.112 1 17.112 0.408
Error 3190.350 76 41.978
Totals 3530.888 79
*p <  .05.
The final group of variables investigated dealt 
with the subjects' reactions to the task itself. A signif­
icant main effect of pay level was found on responses to 
the question, "How interesting were these activities to 
you?" On a six-point scale, the mean response of the under­
paid subjects was 3.975 and that of the overpaid was 3.050,
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with the lower score indicated a perception of the task as 
more interesting. Table 11 shows a summary of the statis­
tical analysis; cell means appear in Table 1 and standard 
deviations in Table 2.
TABLE 11
Analysis of Variance: Ratings by Subjects of 
the Experimental Task as Interesting
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 7.812 1 7.812 3.181
B (Pay Level) 23.112 1 23.112 9.411*
A x B 0.112 1 0.112 0.046
Error 186.650 76 2.456
Totals 217.688 79
*p <  -05.
There was a statistically significant main effect 
of the presence vs. absence of Other on the responses to 
question Ill-b, "How well do you think you did on the task 
you were given?" The mean response of subjects in the 
Other Absent conditions was 3.050; mean for subjects in the 
Other Present conditions was 3.700, with the higher score 
indicating a less faborable perception. As Table 12 demon­
strates, the effects of pay level and of the interaction 
were non-significant.
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TABLE 12
Analysis of Variance: Ratings by Subjects of Their Own 
Perceived Performance on the Experimental Task
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 8.450 1 8.450 4.604*
B (Pay Level) 0.000 1 0.000 0.000
A x B 0.800 1 0.800 0.436
Error 139.500 76 1.836
Totals 148.750 79
*p < .05.
Pay level exerted a significant effect on Ss1 re­
sponses to the question ”. . .  how important was it to you 
that you do the best you could . . Overpaid Ss gave a
mean response of 1.650., indicating greater importance than 
the 2.175 of the underpaid Ss. The effect of Other's pres­
ence and of the interaction were not significant (see Table 
13) .
No significant results were obtained on responses to 
questions c, e, c£, and h in part III of the questionnaire. 
Cell means for these variables are listed in Table 14, with 
standard deviations in Table 15; statistical analyses are 
summarized in Tables 27, 28, 29, and 30 respectively.
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TABLE 13
Analysis of Variance: Ratings by Subjects of 
How Important It Was to Them to Do their 
Best on the Experimental Task
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 0.312 1 0.312 0.226
B (Pay Level) 5.512 1 5.512 3.988*
A x B 1.512 1 1.512 1.094
Error 105.050 76 1.382
Totals 112.388 79
*p <  .05.
DISCUSSION
Work Quality and Quantity
At the outset, it was hypothesized from Equity 
Theory that work quantity would be greater for hourly over­
paid than for underpaid Ss as these groups attempted to 
resolve the pay inequities. In addition, the prediction was 
made that work quality would be less for overpaid subjects 
than for underpaid subjects, since work quantity and quality 
have been shown to be inversely related. An alternate pos­
sibility was presented, based on Pritchard's (1969) sugges­
tions, that the effects of inequity would be demonstrated 
only in the Other Present conditions, since overpay would 
not otherwise generate inequity. The occurrence of this 
possibility would produce a significant interaction between 
pay level and presence vs. absence of Other.
The obtained results failed to bear out any of these 
predictions, since there were no differences in performance 
between any of the four treatment groups. There is no 
evidence, either, for the hypothesized differential impact 
of Other's presence or absence on performance. There are 
several possible explanations for these findings.
First, the nature of the experimental task was such 
that Ss varied widely in their card-sorting strategies and 
consequent performance scores, thus producing large error
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terms in each analysis. As a result, this within-group 
variance may have obscured potential differences between 
groups in both quality and quantity of work.
Secondly, certain characteristics of the experimen­
tal situation might have been responsible for the lack of 
effect of pay differences on performance variables.
Campbell (1969) points out that one threat to the external 
validity of an experiment is the "irrelevant replicability” 
of treatments. In other words, where treatments are com­
plex, a replication of them may not include all the elements 
originally responsible for their effects. It is evident 
that the present experimental situation involved a much 
shorter situation and lower overall payment than most of 
the situations constructed in previous investigations of 
Equity Theory. In addition, each £[— even though he dis­
covered that some other participants were receiving more or 
less than he was— was aware that other members of his own 
class had been recruited, like himself, for a dollar. This 
fact provided the subject with two bases for comparison, 
one of which was not inequitable at all.
Borrowing a term from Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
(Festinger, 1957), it would seem that the "importance of the 
situation and thus the magnitude of the inequity would de­
pend on just such considerations as total working time, 
total amount of pay, and clarity of the relationship with 
Other. We might assume,-therefore, that this situation was
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a relatively unimportant one to the subjects and so did not 
generate a sufficiently high level of inequity to motivate 
differences in performance.
Another possible consideration bearing on irrelevant 
replicability is found in the fact that the amount of mone­
tary payment received by every jS* regardless of condition* 
was the same. Inequity was created by varying the pay of 
Other* while other studies have held Other's pay constant 
and set Person's pay at a higher or lower level. Perhaps 
the social comparison process alone is not sufficient to 
produce inequity; perhaps pay must actually be varied in 
amount and matched by £ against an internal standard before 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction can be generated (Weick* 
1966; Pritchard* 1969).
A third distinct possibility which must be con­
sidered is that the munipulation simply did not generate 
inequity. There is a possible parallel here between the 
present situation and that constructed by Lawler (1968) for 
his OC (overpaid by circumstances) group which did not 
demonstrate performance effects of inequity. Subjects in 
the present study may have attributed differences in pay to 
circumstances beyond their control which had nothing to do 
with their own or Other's inputs or outcomes.
Finally* it may be that dissatisfaction was in fact 
generated by inequity as a result of the experimental manip­
ulations* but that subjects in the different pay conditions
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did not resort to different levels of performance to resolve 
the inequity. Using a similar experimental situation, with 
a 20-minute task and low pay, Weick and Prestholdt (1968) 
found that, while Ss receiving discrepant pay performed at 
a higher quantitative level than equitably paid controls, 
there were no overall performance differences between over­
paid and underpaid Ss.
Cognitive Distortion of Other 1s Inputs
Another initial prediction dealt with the subjects' 
perceptions of Other in the inequitable situations. It was 
hypothesized, in accordance with Adams' (1965) theory, that 
underpaid subjects would rate Other more favorably than 
overpaid subjects did, in an effort to justify the pay dif­
ference on the basis of greater perceived inputs by Other. 
Again, this prediction is modified from Pritchard's (1969) 
point of view to involve a significant interaction between 
pay level and the presence vs. absence of Other.
Responses to question III-c^ on the Assessment of 
Psychological Research questionnaire, "How well do you think 
other participants might have done . . . , " showed no sig­
nificant effect of either independent variable. Adjectival 
ratings of the confederate, however, in part II of the ques­
tionnaire, did reflect some effects of pay level, with the 
direction of the differences in keeping with the predictions 
that were made.
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In terms of the Total Evaluation* or combined adjec­
tival ratings* the confederate was viewed less favorably by 
overpaid than by underpaid Ss. It is reasonable* in Equity 
Theory terms* to assume that Ss would undertake to resolve 
inequity by cognitively distorting those traits of Other 
which appear related to task performance* rather than traits 
such as "Pleasant" or "Considerate*" and this is in fact 
what happened. In the Overpay conditions* when Other re­
ceived less pay than the Ss* the confederate was rated as 
less "Careful*" "Businesslike*" and "Capable" than in the 
Underpay conditions.
An unexpected finding is that the confederate's role 
as Other or as not Other had no effect on the ratings which 
showed significant effects of pay level. One possible ex­
planation for this fact is that the manipulations of the 
presence of Other were not effective and that Ss did not 
perceive the difference in the confederate's roles. Such a 
conclusion seems unlikely* though* since in the Other Absent 
conditions the confederate was visibly performing a differ­
ent task and receiving no pay at all. A more probable 
interpretation is that Ss were not responding to pay ineq­
uity in their ratings of the confederate but rather to some 
other cues in the differential pay instructions.
Cognitive Distortion of Person 1s Inputs
Equity Theory suggests that Person may also under­
take to resolve an inequitable pay situation by cognitively
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distorting his own inputs— increasing their perceived value 
when he is overpaid and decreasing this value when under­
paid. Again the possibility of a statistically significant 
interaction between pay level and Other's presence is raised 
by Pritchard's (1969) suggestions.
There appears to have been an attempt by subjects 
to reduce inequity through a cognitive re-evaluation of 
their own perceived inputs as indicated in responses to 
question Ill-d. of the questionnaire. When asked how impor­
tant it was to them to do their best on the taskj underpaid 
Ss expressed less concern than overpaid Ss. The difference 
is readily interpretable as a lowering of the former group's 
perceived input of motivation or an enhancing of such inputs 
by the latter group.
The only dependent measure which showed a main ef­
fect of Other's presence was the subjects' evaluation of 
how well they felt they had done on the task. Even though 
the physical set-up of the experimental room was such that 
no S_ could see what the confederate was doing^ the fact that 
the latter was working on the same task in the Other Present 
conditions seems to have made Ss in those conditions more 
conservative than Ss in the Other Absent conditions in 
evaluating their own performance. There was no significant 
effect of pay level on this variable, and there appears to 
be no relationship between these findings and Equity Theory.
Cognitive Distortion of Outcomes
Two aspects of perceived outcomes were studied* 
with mixed results. First* it was originally predicted 
that underpaid Ss would enhance the task* rating it higher 
than did the overpaid Ss in order to justify their involve­
ment; in addition to this Equity Theory hypothesis* the 
possibility of Prichard's (1969) predicted interaction was 
discussed. No support was found for either position. There 
were no significant differences obtained in responses to the 
question about the contribution of the research to science. 
The difference due to pay level obtained in responses to a 
question about how interesting the work was lay in the op­
posite direction from that predicted by Equity Theory* with 
no significant effect of the presence or absence of Other.
The lack of significant effects on the question 
about the contribution to science (question Ill-e in the 
questionnaire) might well be explained in the same way as 
was the lack of significant differences in the performance 
variables. Either the conditions producing inequity were 
sufficiently different from those manipulated in earlier 
experiments* or the inequitable situations themselves were 
sufficiently unimportant* that cognitive differences in this 
area were not produced. The unpredicted outcome of the 
question about how interesting the task was, however* raises 
a serious question for Equity Theory. Underpaid Ss appar­
ently did not attempt to justify their participation through
task enhancement; favorable perception of the task was 
directly related to the amount of pay received for it.
Again there was no effect of Other's presence or absence.
The second possible cognitive distortion of outcomes 
studied was that of the pay itself. Here again, the pre­
dicted differences in perceptions of monetary pay as a 
means of reducing the inequity failed to materialize. The 
mean response of all Ss indicates that compensation for 
their work was of moderate importance to them at best in 
this situation and that the pay they received was viewed by 
them— with some individual exceptions— as slightly too high. 
The lack of support for Equity Theory predictions must again 
be attributed to those factors (excluding in this case a 
large error variance) which were cited to account for the 
lack of performance differences.
Evaluations of the Employer
The reaction of an employee to an employer responsi­
ble for an inequitable pay situation is an area with which 
Equity Theory per se does not deal. We might infer, though, 
that within this theoretical framework the dissatisfied £> 
would cognitively re-evaluate the employer in the same way 
he does the task in order to resolve inequity. Pritchard 
(1969), on the other hand, makes a very specific prediction 
with regard to the underpaid subjects' reaction to an em­
ployer. The inequity will be attributed to the latter and
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he will be viewed unfavorably as a result; thus we would 
expect an employer responsible for overpay to be viewed 
more positively if Pritchard's (1969) position is correct.
The findings of the present study are in direct 
support of Pritchard (1969) in this respect. Significant 
differences were found in the Total Evaluation of E com­
piled from individual adjectival ratings; overpaid Ss were 
more favorable than were underpaid Ss. Individually, the 
more work-oriented adjectives yielded similar results. 
Overpaid Ss rated E as significantly more "Businesslike," 
"Efficient," and "Capable" than did underpaid Ss, while the 
non-job-related traits of "Pleasant" and "Considerate."
The probable explanation is that, as Pritchard (1969) sug­
gests, the overpay condition is not readily seen as one of 
inequity. There was again no support, however, for 
Pritchard's (1969) contention that the presence and absence 
of Other should have a differential effect on Ss' responses 
to the situation.
Conclusions and Implications
The foregoing results do not provide unequivocal 
support for Equity Theory, nor are they totally at variance 
with it. Some consideration seems in order of possible ex­
tensions or modifications of the theory in response to the 
data, as well as of possible implications of the present 
findings for the "real world" of work.
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The experimental situation was one involving a short 
work period, low total pay, and possible ambiguity in the 
identity of Other. Subjects resolved pay inequity by cog­
nitively distorting their own and possibly Other's inputs, 
but not by differential levels of work quality or quantity 
or cognitive distortion of the nature of the outcomes 
(significance and interesting nature of the work, importance 
and appropriateness of pay). In his theorizing, Adams (1965) 
makes all these maneuvers available for use by workers in the 
reduction of inequity; he also suggests (Adams, 1968) that 
the choice of strategies in any given situation will be de­
termined by one or more of the following: competing motiva­
tional states of the Ss, their prior learning and response 
sets, personality variables, and situational and task vari­
ables .
As he states them, these determinants appear some­
what vague and more suited to post hoc interpretations of 
data. The foregoing findings suggest a possible elaboration, 
at least of the notion of situational variables as a 
determinant of Ss' inequity-reducing behavior. We have 
suggested the concept of "importance" of the situation and 
have assumed that the present situation was a relatively 
unimportant one to the Ss and so did not generate a suffi­
ciently high level of inequity to produce differences in 
performance levels. We can easily conceive of Ss resolving 
low-level inequity by the simplest, most convenient means sit
hand. It is probable that a cognitive distortion of out­
comes would be difficult for Ss due to the uniqueness of 
the research situation and their consequent lack of external 
criteria for judgement. Similarly., changes in performance 
would be difficult due to the unfamiliarity of the task and 
the lack of guidelines as to expected productivity. Ss1 
cognitions dealing with their own perceived performance or 
with another person in the same room, however, should be 
more amenable to alteration to suit the occasion. Further 
investigation involving a systematic variation of the 
situational elements potentially associated with a situa­
tion's "importance" would throw further light on the role 
of this concept in the determination of choice of inequity- 
resolving strategies. Potential generalization from this 
aspect of the present study is limited, since the typical 
real-world work situation would involve long-term employment 
and greater absolute pay.
Another possibility for Equity Theory, based on a 
second interpretation of the present findings, is a need for 
a more restricted definition of inequity. If the predicted 
effects of inequity on performance can be obtained only by 
manipulation of pay amount as well as social comparison—  
that is, if the comparison process itself is not enough—  
then the theory will have to encompass the idea of the 
operation of an internal standard in producing satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction with pay.
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Further implications of the role of Other may be 
seen here. First, whether or not he is physically present 
in the actual work situation does not appear to matter as 
far as Ss' job attitudes or performance are concerned.
Ratings of the confederate in the Other Absent situations 
suggest further that a present individual, even though he 
is not at all involved in comparable activities, may serve 
some of the functions as the comparison Other described by 
Equity Theory.
The final area for suggested broadening of the theory 
is that of employees' attitudes toward an employer responsi­
ble for an inequitable pay situation. The present findings 
are the first available, in this framework, dealing with 
this topic, and they suggest that these attitudes may not 
conform to the expectations of Equity Theory. Ss responded 
more favorably to an E who overpaid them, even in a face-to- 
face relationship with an underpaid Other, than did under­
paid Ss to their E. This difference in attitudes apparently 
generalized somewhat to the task in this particular experi­
ment, but it was not reflected in performance. Increased 
relative pay, then, led to significantly greater satisfaction 
but with no associated effects on performance; the lack of a 
direct relationship between satisfaction and performance is a 
finding in keeping with much other research data gathered 
both in the laboratory and in actual work settings (Smith & 
Cranny, 1968).
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APPENDIX A
ASSESSMENT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH
The Department of Psychology is interested in eval­
uating research conducted by graduate students in psychology. 
You are requested, as a recent participant in such research, 
to answer the questions below regarding the individual who 
conducted the research and regarding the activities in which 
you were engaged.
Do not write your name on this questionnaire or show 
it to anyone before you turn it in. Please be sure to 
answer all the questions as instructed and as honestly as 
you can. Turn in your completed questionnaire to the Psychol­
ogy Department Office as soon as you are through.
I. EVALUATION OF THE RESEARCHER:
In each instance, indicate on the scales by circling 
the appropriate number after the word, how well you feel each 
of the descriptive words applies to the researcher for whom 
you participated.
KEY: 1) very much like him 4) slightly unlike him
2) moderately like him 5) moderately unlike him
3) slightly like him 6) very much unlike him
Evaluative descriptions:
Pleasant 1 2  3 4 5 6
Careful 1 2  3 4 5 6
Businesslike 1 2  3 4 5 6
Efficient 1 2  3 4 5 6
Considerate 1 2  3 4 5 6
Capable 1 2  3 4 5 6
Now check below the general statement which best ex­
presses how you felt about the researcher.
_I viewed him very favorably.
_I viewed him moderately favorably. 
_I viewed him slightly favorably.
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 I viewed him slightly unfavorably.
 I viewed him moderately unfavorably.
 I viewed him very unfavorably.
II. BASELINE EVALUATION:
For comparison purposes , we need to know how you 
rate someone else with whom you have recently been in con­
tact. If there was another person in the research situation
with you, rate him here in a manner similar to the above.
If there was no one, rate the professor from the course from 
which you were recruited.
Pleasant 1 2 3 4 5 6
Careful 1 2 3 4 5 6
Businesslike 1 2 3 4 5 6
Efficient 1 2 3 4 5 6
Considerate 1 2 3 4 5 6
Capable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Now check below the general statement which best ex­
presses how you felt about this individual.
 I viewed him very favorably.
 I viewed him moderately favorably.
 I viewed him slightly favorably.
 I viewed him slightly unfavorably.
 I viewed him moderately unfavorably.
 I viewed him very unfavorably.
III. EVALUATION OF RESEARCH ACTIVITY;
Below are several questions regarding the activities 
in which you were involved as a research participant.
(a) How interesting were these activities to you? 
Circle the appropriate number on the scale to indicate the 
degree of your feeling.
Very Very
Interesting 1 2  3 4 5 6 uninteresting
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(b) How well do you think you did in the task you 
were given? Show your evaluation of your own performance by 
circling a number on the scale.
Very good 1 2 3 4 5 6 Very poor
(c) How well do you think other participants might 
have done on the same task? Indicate your evaluation of the 
probable performance of others.
Very good 1 2 3 4 5 6 Very poor
(d) As you participated* how important was it to you 
that you do the best you could on the task?
Very Very
important 1 2  3 4 5 6 unimportant
(e) Do you feel the research in which you were in­
volved is significant? Is it likely to make an important 
contribution to science?
Very Very
important 1 2  3 4 5 6 unimportant
(f) Did you receive compensation for your participa­
tion? Check one:
/ / academic points / / money / / none
(g) How adequate was the compensation you received? 
Do you feel that you were fairly compensated for your par­
ticipation?
Compensation Compensation
too high 1 2 3 4 5 6 too low
(h) We are interested in whether you would be will­
ing to participate in such research without compensation. 
Indicate below how important the reward was to you in this 
case.
Very Very
important 1 2  3 4 5 6 unimportant
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION.
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APPENDIX B 
RESEARCH AGREEMENT
I agree to participate in research project #____
in exchange for_________________ .
I further agree not to discuss the nature of the 
research or of my participation with anyone else until 
otherwise notified.
Signature:
Class:____
Date:  ___
APPENDIX C 
Tables 14 through
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TABLE 14
Cell Means for Those Dependent Variables Not Yielding 
Statistically Significant Differences
Variables
Underpay Overpay
0 Absent 0 Present 0 Absent 0 Present
Performance Variables
Total Cards Ordered 95.400 71.200 95.000 81.950
Percent Errors 25.600 22.150 24.650 22.250
Cards Ordered Cor­
rectly 62.200 51.600 60.200 61.150
Questionnaire - Part I 
(Experimenter)
"Pleasant1 1.850 1.850 1.450 1.700
"Careful" 2.000 2.350 2.100 1.800
"Considerate" 1.850 1.850 1.500 1.700
General Rating 1.850 1.650 1.450 1.450
Questionnaire - Part II 
(Confederate)
"Pleasant" 2.450 2.450 3.000 2.900
"Efficient" 2.150 2.350 2.600 2.400
"Considerate" 2.150 2.500 2.550 2.950
General Rating 2.500 2.650 2.950 3.000
Questionnaire - Part III
(c) 2.650 3.400 3.200 3.300
(e) 3.450 3.050 2.700 2.900
(g) 2.650 2.800 2.550 2.400
(h) 4.350 3.350 3.850 3.400
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TABLE 15
Cell Standard Deviations for Those Dependent Variables 
Not Yielding Statistically Significant Differences
Variables
Underpay Overpay
0 Absent 0 Present O Absent O Present
Performance Variables
Total Cards Ordered 82.584 35.788 85.718 76.280
Percent Errors 16.384 14.914 16.927 13.954
Cards Ordered Cor­
rectly 36.226 16.388 37.404 47.922
Questionnaire - Part I
"Pleasant" 1.039 1.850 0.825 0.864
"Careful" 0.794 1.348 0.820 0.695
"Considerate" 1.225 1.424 1.146 0.732
General Rating 0.744 0.586 0.509 0.944
Questionnaire - Part II
"Pleasant" 1.181 1.431 1.256 1.252
"Efficient" 0.812 1.424 1.142 1.045
"Considerate" 0.874 1.468 1.431 1.571
General Rating 0.888 1.460 1.145 1.169
Questionnaire - Part III
(c) 0.812 1.230 1.239 0.864
(e) 1.431 1.571 1.341 1.209
(g) 1.225 1.004 1.275 0.994
(h) 1.953 1.953 1.953 1.846
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TABLE 16
Analysis of Variance: Total Cards Put in 
Numerical Order
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 6937.812 1 6937.812 1.305
B (Pay Level) 535.612 1 535.612 0.101
A x B 621.612 1 621.612 0.117
Error 404,078.950 76 5316.828
Totals 412,173.988 79
Analysis of
TABLE 17
Variance: Per 
in Incorrect '
Cent
Order
of Cards Put
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 171.112 1 171.112 0.704
B (Pay Level) 3.612 1 3.612 0.015
A x B 5.512 1 5.512 0.023
Error 18,471.650 76 243.048
Totals 18,651.888 79
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TABLE 18
Analysis of Variance: Number of Cards Put in
Correct Order
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 465.612 1 465.612 0.353
B (Pay Level) 285.012 1 285.012 0.216
A x B 667.012 1 667.012 0.506
Error 100,255.750 76 1319.155
Totals 101,673.388 79
T
TABLE 19
Analysis of Variance: Ratings of 
Adjective "Pleasant"
E on the
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 0.312 1 0.312 0.320
B (Pay Level) 1.512 1 1.512 1.548
A x B 0.312 1 0.312 0.320
Error 74.250 76 0.977
Totals 76.388 79
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TABLE 20
Analysis of Variance: Ratings of E on the 
Adjective "Careful"
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 0.012 1 0.012 0.006
B (Pay Level) 1.012 1 1.012 0.508
A x B 2.112 1 2.112 1.059
Error 151.550 76. 1.994
Totals 154.688 79
TABLE 21
Analysis of Variance: Ratings of E on the 
Adjective "Considerate"
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 0.200 1 0.200 0.148
B (Pay Level) 1.250 1 1.250 0.928
A x B 0.200 1 0.200 0.148
Error 102.300 76. 1.346
Totals 103.950 79
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TABLE 22
Analysis of Variance: General Ratings of 
Favorability toward E
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 0.200 1 0.200 0.390
B (Pay Level) 1.800 1 1.800 3.508
A x B 0.200 1 0.200 0.390
Error 39.000 76. 0.513
Totals 41.200 79
TABLE 23
Analysis of Variance: Ratings 
on the Adjective "
of the 
Pleasant
Confederate
II
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 0.050 1 0.050 0.033
B (Pay Level) 5.000 1 5.000 3.342
A x B 0.050 1 0.050 0.033
Error 113.700 76 1.496
Totals 118.800 79
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TABLE 24
Analysis of Variance: Ratings of the Confederate 
on the Adjective "Efficient"
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 0.000 1 0.000 0.000
B (Pay Level) 1.250 1 1.250 0.982
A x B 0.800 1 0.800 0.629
Error 96.700 76 1.272
Totals 98.750 79
Analysis
TABLE 25
of Variance: Ratings of the Confederate 
on the Adjective "Considerate"
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 2.812 1 2.812 1.511
B (Pay Level) 3.612 1 3.612 1.941
A x B 0.012 1 0.012 0.007
Error 141.450 76 1.861
Totals 147.888 79
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TABLE 26
Analysis of Variance: General Ratings of 
Favorability toward the Confederate
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 0.200 1 0.200 0.143
B (Pay Level) 3.200 1 3.200 2.284
A x B 0.050 1 0.050 0.036
Error 106.500 
Totals 109.950
76
79
1.401
TABLE 27
Analysis of Variance: Ratings by Subjects of 
Perceived Performance of Other Participants 
the Experimental Task
the
on
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 3.612 1 3.612 3.240
B (Pay Level) 1.012 1 1.012 0.908
A x B 2.112 1 2.112 1.894
Error 84.750 76 1.115
Totals 91.488 79
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TABLE 28
Analysis of Variance: Ratings by Subjects of the 
Research's Contribution to Science
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 0.200 1 0.200 0.103
B (Pay Level) 4.050 1 4.050 2.081
A x B 1.800 1 1.800 0.925
Error 147.900 76 1.946
Totals 153.950 79
TABLE 29
Analysis of Variance: Ratings by Subjects of the 
Adequacy of the Compensation They Received for
Participating
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 0.000 1 0.000 0.000
B (Pay Level) 1.250 1 1.250 0.974
A x B 0.450 1 0.450 0.351
Error 97.500 76 1.283
Totals 99.200 79
TABLE 30
Analysis of Variance: Ratings by Subjects of tbe 
Importance of the Compensation to Them
Source SS df MS F
A (Presence of Other) 10.512 1 10.512 2.829
B (Pay Level) 1.012 1 1.012 0.272
A x B 1.512 1 1.512 0.407
Error 282.450 76 3.716
Totals 295.488 79
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